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Annex M

Information concerning the U-2 mission of 14 October, consisting of:

The Intelligence Justification

~~A memorandum~~ entitled "Background Leading to Selection of  
Proposed Mission 3101, 14 October 1962"

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A map showing the planned route and the route actually flown

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USIB-D-41.5/25  
(COMOR-D-24/20)  
5 October 1962  
Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Intelligence Justification for U-2 Overflight of Cuba

The attached COMOR-developed statement of intelligence justification for U-2 overflight of Cuba will be placed on the agenda of the 10 October USIB meeting for consideration and approval of the Board. COMOR-M-105, referenced therein, is available to Board members through their representatives on the COMOR.

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Executive Secretary

Attachment

Copies:

- 1.....DCI TCO
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- 4.....DIA (Col. May)
- 5,6,7,8 ..DIA TCO
- 9.....OACSI TCO
- 10.....ONI TCO
- 11,12 .....AFCIN TCO
- 13,14 .....NSA TCO
- 15.....AEC
- 16.....FBI
- 17.....DCI TCO (for USIB/S)
- 18.....Chairman, COMOR
- 19.....Chairman, GMAIC
- 20.....Chairman, Board of  
National Estimates

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GROUP 1  
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downgrading and  
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Attachment

USIB-D-41.5/25

(COMOR-D-24/20)

5 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Intelligence Justification for  
U-2 Overflight of Cuba

REFERENCE: COMOR-M-105

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The attached intelligence justification for U-2 overflight of Cuba is forwarded for consideration and approval of the United States Intelligence Board. This proposal should be considered in conjunction with COMOR-M-105, which summarizes the capabilities of peripheral reconnaissance.

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Acting Chairman  
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment:  
Subject Paper

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Attachment  
USIB-D-41.5/25  
(COMOR-D-24/20)

# INTELLIGENCE JUSTIFICATION FOR U-2 OVERFLIGHTS OF CUBA

1. There is now a pressing and continuing need for up-to-date intelligence on the progress of the Soviet arms buildup in Cuba. The very highest levels of the government are dependent upon this intelligence to assist in making policy decisions of immediate and vital concern to the nation. At the present time, this intelligence can best be provided, with sufficient timeliness and broadness of scope, by overflying Cuba with the U-2.

2. The items of most immediate concern are the missile installations springing up all over the island. SA-2 sites are present in various stages of construction, including some sites where available photography shows only the missile hardware present with no actual construction yet under way (e.g., Jiguani suspect SAM site). There are also SSM sites which have been observed on recent coverage of the eastern end of the island and on the Isle of Pines. Two sites on older coverage of Cuba have also been re-evaluated as SSM rather than SAM sites. The absence of coverage of the western end since August 29, coupled with the rate of construction we have observed, means that there may well be many more sites now being built of which we are unaware. Ground observers have in several recent instances, reported sightings of what they believe to be the SS-4 (SHYSTER) MRBM in Cuba. These reports must be confirmed or denied by photo coverage. It is also necessary to know how many KOMAR class PGMGs may be in service.

3. In addition to the missile threat, on which it is so important to obtain late date knowledge, we have confirmed the presence of MIG-21 aircraft in Cuba. Estimates (based on sightings of merchant shipping with crates which may contain more disassembled MIG-21s) already have been made in figures as high as 36 although we have firm photo confirmation of only one. We have no way of substantiating these estimates at the present time other than through overhead reconnaissance.

4. Given this extensive buildup of arms, the possibility of U. S. operations in the area cannot be ignored. To prepare for such events, the responsible commanders (in the case of overt military

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
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(COMOR-D-24/20)

operations) and organizations (in the case of clandestine or unconventional operations) require up-to-date intelligence on the areas in which they may be working. These requirements are secondary to the requirements outlined in paragraphs 2 and 3 above. But they are nonetheless important and potentially of even greater importance.

5. The requirements stated above have been translated into a list of objectives by the COMOR Working Group. This list is maintained up-to-date on the basis of all-source intelligence and a plot of them as of 1 October is appended as TAB A for information. The schedule of satellite missions approved for the remainder of the year will probably provide some intelligence, but it is not timely enough nor of sufficient resolution to meet our needs. The next mission will not be till mid-November, some 11 weeks after the last good coverage of some areas. FIRE FLY may also prove highly useful in covering specific objectives of limited scope. But the small area coverage obtainable by FIRE FLY makes it less desirable than the U-2. Tactical reconnaissance using RF-101/F8U-1P aircraft may also prove feasible. But this is supplementary to a U-2 program, not a substitute therefor. Tactical reconnaissance can provide detailed photography for technical intelligence purposes, but not the repeated, wide area coverage necessary to cover the present objectives.

6. There is only one presently available way to meet the requirements of the government: frequent and regular U-2 overflights of the island to the extent that primary objectives as shown in TAB A are covered once a month. The COMOR recognizes the increased risk to the aircraft in light of the SA-2 and MIG-21 aircraft present there. But it must be stated that the current need is extremely urgent, and the risk involved should be very thoroughly weighed before this coverage is denied.

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